For any pledge system to function effectively, enticing lenders to part with their capital temporarily, the system must allow secured credi tors5 to feel reasonably assured that they will be able ultimately to regain their investments. Although secured creditors wish to avoid fore closure and satisfaction from the collateral as much as debtors do,6 they must have confidence that the system will provide them an acceptable means of realizing a return if eventually they are forced to foreclose on the collateral to avoid a loss.
While the new provisions on pledge have the potential to assure lenders of the security of their investments, and thus to stimulate greater flow of capital into Russian enterprises, several shortcomings might in hibit the effective achievement of the goals underlying these provisions.
This Note focuses on one crucial birth defect of the fledgling Civil Code: it limits the mechanisms available to secured creditors for realiz ing on collateral following foreclosure by requiring that the collateral be tion will apply here as well. See, e.g., William G. Frenkel, New Russian Secured Tr ans actions Regime: Analysis of the Law on Pledge, SEEL, Mar. 1993, at l, 1. [Unless oth erwise indicated, all translations in this Note of Russian and French materials are those of the author.] One might more accurately translate the word zalog as security interest, see U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1990), as it clearly encompasses much more than the narrow historical connotation of the word pledge, which involves an obligatory transfer of col lateral to the secured creditor (a transaction described more accurately by the Russian word zaklad). See infra note 11. The reader should realize that pledge here is to be un derstood in the broader sense of "general security interest," a connotation that the term apparently has taken on in many civil law countries. See, e.g., GEORGES R. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND EcONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FI NANCING 239 (1967) .
Security interests appear in a variety of contexts, but most prominently in loan transactions involving an obligation to return borrowed funds. When a consumer purchases a car with money borrowed from a bank or an automobile financier or when a factory acquires a loan from a financial institution to expand its operations, the lender desires more assurance than simply the good word of the borrower that the money will be returned. Therefore, it takes a security interest in an item of a value equal to or greater than the amount of the debt, for instance, in the examples listed above, the car or the equipment or inventory of the factory. If the borrower fails to make interest pay ments or to repay the loan according to its terms (in other words, if the borrower "de faults"), the security interest provides a basis for the lender to go and take the item act ing as security (to repossess or "foreclose on the collateral") and dispose of it to satisfy the repayment obligation. See, e.g., GK RF art. 334. From the foregoing, it should be clear that if the creditor cannot effectively enforce the security interest and dispose of the collateral, the entire effort to secure the debt has been for naught See infra note 25. 5. A variety of terms exist for designating the parties in a secured transaction, such as obligor-obligee, pledgor-pledgee, creditor-debtor, and so forth. For purposes of uniformity and consistency, and in conformity with the convention in article 307 of the Russian Civil Code, this Note refers to the party to whom the secured obligation is owed as the "creditor" or the "secured creditor," and the party who owes the obliga tion as the "debtor."
6. See infra section 11.B.1.
sold at public auction.7 This limitation might seriously undermine credi tor comfort with the personal property security system in Russia. Lack of creditor confidence in the ability to cover the potential losses of debtor default with the collateral securing loans likely will produce one of two unpleasant results: either a dearth of available loan funds will arise as creditors refuse to risk their capital, or lenders will begrudg ingly provide loans only at exorbitant rates of interest, which will stifle all but the boldest of potential debtors. 8 In either case the progress of Russian enterprise will be greatly slowed or halted.
This Note argues that the current Russian law governing the reali zation of repossessed collateral is potentially harmful to both secured creditors and debtors alike, and it therefore proposes amendments that would benefit both parties.9 Part I briefly examines the antecedent of the present Russian pledge law and describes the restrictions imposed by the current law. Part II looks to the pledge regimes of several Euro pean legal systems to explain and challenge the Russian approach. This
Part also criticizes the Russian restriction based on the development of North American secured transactions law. Finally, Part ill proposes sev eral possible alternatives for broadening the options available to credi tors for satisfying the obligations owed to them following foreclosure. Commerce and industry need inexpensive capital; lending secured by pledge should be one of the most economical means of procuring [capital] since it con fers a privilege of a certain value to the lender. Otherwise, the capitalist hesitates or demands to be paid more dearly because, in the state of legislation, he is not assured of recovering his funds at the time indicated in the contract; his reim bursement might be postponed by the spirit of chicanery and the delays of a trial.
Id. For a more modem expression of similar sentiments delivered by three commenta tors, see !NTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SECURED COMMERCIAL LENDING IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES 22 (Jonathan Bates et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter CIS CONFERENCE] (Alan Farnsworth: "[P]ersonal property security is regarded as vital to the successful operation of a market economy. In such an econ omy a system of personal property security law is therefore just as essential as a system of contract law." Id. at 27-28); (Lane Blumenfeld: "Without security, financial institu tions will not lend, and without lending, business cann ot flourish." Id. at 47); (Ronald Dwight "The lack of an effective collateral law in Poland is one of the principal blocks to the development of modem finance in Poland and a block to the development of the entire banking system." Id. at 37). 9. It is hoped that such suggestions will be especially timely now, as Russian leg islation undergoes a constant whirlwind of reform and development. Similarly, as other developing countries, particularly the other former republics of the Soviet Union, begin to draft their own secured transactions laws, they may also benefit from the analysis in this Note.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY AND THE CURRE NT STATE OF THE LAW
This Part first touches briefly on the wholly insufficient attention given to pledge law during the Soviet period, then it examines the greatly improved, yet still slightly deficient, system of secured transac tions in present-day Russia.
When it became apparent that secured lending would have to play a prominent role in the development of a rich new Russian market economy, Russian legislators likely built upon the base constructed by their predecessors.10 During the Soviet period of a command economy, elaborate provisions for securing the repayment of debts were unneces sary because both the providers and the major consumers of credit be longed to the state. State banks made generous loans on extremely favorable terms to government enterprises. If an enterprise defaulted on its loans, the government had simply transferred funds from one pocket to another, it was of little import where the money eventually happened to accumulate. This attitude was reflected in the skeletal provisions on pledge in the old Soviet Civil Code, and no separate law existed to ex pand on this miserly treatment.11 The few "hopelessly rudimentary" 1 2 10. Although this section discusses only Soviet law, prerevolutionary Russian law also included provisions concerning the pledge of property as security for obligations, which were also accompanied by various limitations on the disposition of collateral.
The Sobornoe Ulozhenie of 1649 provided for obligatory and unconditional transfer of ownership of the collateral to the creditor in case of default. Ulozhenie, ch. 10, art. 196 (1649) , in 1 POLNOE SoBRANIE ZAKONOV ROSSIISKOI IMPERii art. 1 (1830). During the next century, lawmakers first required public auction of collateral, then they abro gated that requirement. See A.V. CHERNYKH, ZALoG NEDVIZHIMOSTI v ROSSIISKOM PRA VE 20 (1995) . Despite the legal disfavor into which public auction had fallen, how ever, the Russian government, which had begun to act as secured creditor, continued to include in its secured transactions a condition of obligatory public auction of collateral in the event of default. See id.
This government stance on public auction eventually led to reform in the permitted methods of repossession and disposition of collateral. From this reform at the turn of the nineteenth century, and for more than a century until the Revolution, Russian pledge law contained a default requirement of public auction, but the default rule was subject to exception. After the debtor had defaulted on a secured obligation, the debtor or any of her other creditors had the right to demand a public auction of the collateral. See Us tav 0 bankrotakh, pt. 2, art. 54 (1800) (1) ("The collateral shall remain with the debtor unless otherwise provided for by agreement"). Compare this provision with the language of its predecessor: "The collateral •.. shall be transferred to the secured party unless oth erwise provided by law or agreement" GK RSFSR art. 196 (1964) . But see supra note 11 and accompanying text Although the practical effect of these provisions is the same, the legal presumption, and seemingly the preference, has shifted to nonpossessory interests. 5-6, 9, 20, 23, 25, 36-38, 44, 46, 49-51, 53-54, 56-58 (all making reference to the security agree ment as a possible central or controlling factor in the detennination of the rights and re sponsibilities of the parties). The Code directs that the sale be conducted in accordance with procedural legislation, which leads the ill-fated secured creditor to the archaic Russian Civil Procedural Code.27 The Procedural Code directs that a court officer shall conduct the auction and that the collateral be turned over to her for sale between five days and one month after fore closure.28 The court officer is responsible for publicizing the auction and for notifying the secured creditor -who can bid on the collateral -of the time and place of the auction.29 discussed immediately below. Article 350 of the Civil Code appears explicitly to reverse the more liberal position on realization in the Law on Pledge. Given that the drafters of article 350 have excluded from the new Code provision any deference to the wishes of the parties, they apparently have limited the alternatives for realization of the collateral to one option: public sale. This conclusion is supported by a comparison of the language of the foreclosure provisions in the Code with the provisions on the subsequent realization of foreclosed collateral. Article 349 of the Code provides for foreclosure on both immovable (real) and movable (personal) property "according to the decision of a court." GK RF art. 349(1)-(2). However, article 349 expressly gives the parties the freedom to agree on a different foreclosure procedure, avoiding recourse to the court. See GK RF art. 349 (1) (2). Moreover, for true pledges, when the creditor holds the collateral, the parties can even define their own foreclosure procedure in advance in the security agreement. See GK RF art. 349(2).
See

The very next article, on the other hand, then orders the parties to sell this "fore closed" collateral at public auction, and it conspicuously lacks any exception for con trary agreement, either before or after conclusion of the security agreement. See GK RF art. 350. Where Russian legislators have intended to provide for deference to party agreement, they have apparently done so in numerous places. See supra note 23. It would seem to follow that where they have not done so, Russian lawmakers have in tended to prohibit any deviation from the prescriptions of the Code, and given the his torical formalism of the Russian judiciary, Russian judges will likely interpret the direc posit with the court officer a document certifying that they are not legally prohibited from acquiring ownership of the collateral, along with a sum equal to ten percent of the initial bidding price of the collateral. See GPK RSFSR art. 402. The initial bidding price is determined according to the method of foreclosure, see supra note 26: If fore closure was accomplished through judicial process, then a judge will decide the initial price; otherwise, the parties must agree upon an initial price. See GK RF art. 350(3).
If certain procedural irregularities occur during or after the sale, the auction is declared void, 30 and the secured creditor receives her first chance to retain the collateral in partial satisfaction of the obligation.
Unfortunately for the debtor, the secured creditor talces the collateral not in the sense of "strict foreclosure, "31 but rather by crediting the ini tial bidding price to the remaining unpaid amount of the secured obliga tion and pursuing a deficiency remedy for the remainder.32 Moreover, the secured creditor can bide her time, refuse the collateral, and await a repeat auction.33 If the auction is declared void a second time, the se cured creditor can appropriate the twice-spurned collateral and credit the debtor for an amount "no more than ten percent less than the initial sale price of the collateral at repeat auction. "34 If the secured creditor fails to talce the collateral and credit the debtor, the security agreement terminates. 35 If, on the other hand, the collateral produces a return at auction in excess of the obligation, the secured creditor is obligated to return the excess to the debtor,36 although any surplus return is, as one prominent commentator has observed, but a "glittering mirage."37 The "grim reality" is an inadequate return on the collateral and a deficiency demand by the secured creditor.38
One can imagine the tribulation that the parties might undergo in arriving at a mutually acceptable price, and the law seems to ignore this problem entirely. For criticism of the problem of establishing a fair price at auction, see CHERNYKH. supra note 10, at 80. 30. In order to take her prize, the winning bidder must within five days remit the entire amount of the winning bid, minus a credit for the initial 10% deposit, and if she fails to present the funds within the time period, her 10% deposit forfeits to the state and the auction is declared void. See GPK RSFSR arts. 402, 403(3) . The auction pro ceedings suffer a similar fate if fewer than two bidders appear at the auction or if none of the bidders proposes a bid in excess of the initial price. See GPK RSFSR art. 403(1) 33. The court officer may announce a second auction no sooner than ten days after the initial failed proceedings, and the repeat auction begins at the agreed initial bidding price or "at the first price offered." See GPK RSFSR art. 404. one can only speculate about the motivations of the Russian legislature in crafting the secured transactions law as it did. However, Russia joins a number of other European countries in statutorily requiring realization of collateral through public auction, and the reasoning of those other countries' legislatures for imposing the restriction provides the best source of insight into the rationale for the Russian legislators' similar decision. This Part reveals that the European limitations have been eroded in many ways not present in the Russian context, and it argues that the reasoning behind the limitation is not as well founded as its proponents originally thought. Section II.A discusses certain European realization regimes and argues that, despite the apparent adoption of the public auction limitation by several commercially sophisticated Western European states, each of these systems actually allows greater flexibility than might immediately appear. Section 11.B scrutinizes the major pol icy consideration for restraining the creditor and argues that little or no protection is necessary to counter creditor laxity during realization be cause the creditor has a vested interest in maximizing resale price.
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Moreover, this section demonstrates that the current language of the Russian law expands, rather than limits, opportunities for abuse by the creditor. Finally, section 11.C challenges the restriction based on the de velopment of secured transactions law in North America.
A. We stern European History and Practice
Since the countries of Western Europe have engaged in free-market commerce for a significant amount of time and have accumulated a rich history of practice over many years, Russian lawmakers understandably Mar. 20, 1996) ; E-mail froni Brenda Horrigan, atty., Salans, Hertzfeld & Heilbraun, Moscow, to author (Apr. 7, 1996) ; E-mail from Ilya Nikiforov, Administrator, FPLE GAL Digest, to author (Mar. 23, 1996) . See, e.g., Jonathan H. Hines, Russia's New Civil Code Further Improves Climate fo r Business, SEEL, Jan. 1995, at 1, 1.
pletion of an intensive redrafting of the Dutch Civil Code,41 advice from the Dutch was undoubtedly of great value to the Russian drafting pro cess, and German scholars also provided significant consultation in the drafting effort. Although direct French participation was limited, the venerable Code Napoleon and the history of its adoption provide insight into the possible motivations of the Russian drafters, particularly re garding their decision to impose the public auction restriction.
This section examines the provisions on pledge in the civil codes of the Netherlands, Germany, and France, focusing on the rigidity or flexibility with which they regulate a creditor's actions in realizing on collateral after foreclosure. After presenting the general limitation in each code, this section points to the language of the codes and to con temporary practice to show that the limitations of the European laws are not as confining as they initially might appear in isolation. Therefore, the strictures of the Russian Civil Code, while supposedly founded on European practice, actually bind creditors' hands significantly more than their Western European counterparts. This section also alludes to possible application of these European approaches in the Russian con text. Section II.A.1 examines statutory language that confmes and pro vides exceptions to the public auction limitation. Section II.A.2 dis cusses the dilution of the limitation by narr ow interpretation of the statutory language. Finally, section II.A.3 looks beyond the codes to commercial practice that sidesteps the pledge law entirely and relies on other, more permissive legal constructs for security.
Other Code Provisions
The German, Dutch, and French Civil Codes all contain some pro vision initially dictating that, following foreclosure, the creditor shall effectuate a resale of the collateral in order to satisfy her demands by way of public auction.42 However, while the Russian Code stops here, the European codes continue and offer greater flexibility by retreating from the initial, bright-line limitation.
One important exception in the European codes is an allowance for sale by a broker when the collateral consists of property normally sold on a recognized market. The German Civil Code, for example, provides that if the collateral has an "exchange or a market price," the creditor A more significant exception that appears in both the German and Dutch Civil Codes allows the parties to deviate freely from the confines of the public sale when they feel that a modified procedure more likely would lead to an optimal return. After default has occurred, the parties may privately agree to seek realization of the collateral in some other way, such as through private sale.47 Moreover, if either party feels that a method of sale other than that prescribed by the law more equitably protects her interests, that party may demand that the disposition take place in that way.48 If the parties fail to agree on an alternate method of 
Na rro w In terpretation of the Limitation
Although the clear wording of the European codes may seem strictly to limit the creditor to on1y one option for disposing of the col lateral, in some cases European courts and commentators have made broad inroads into these restrictions by reading exceptions into the lan guage of the initial rules. If Russian courts apply similar interpretations to the current Russian provisions, creditors might regain substantial freedom. These alternate remedies are, however, by no means wholly satisfactory, and the extensive experience and analysis leading to such alternatives in Western Europe has not yet had time to develop in Russia.
These inferential exceptions to the public auction requirement have wedged their way between the cracks of the statutory building blocks from the very beginning. At his first presentation to the Conseil d'Etat50 of the draft of what eventually would become article 2078 of the Code Napoleon,51 Theophile Berlier52 noted that the restrictions on disposition of collateral could be avoided entirely simply by having the debtor transfer title to the collateral by sale to the creditor.53 Despite the con cerns of many commentators who feared that this might give rise to fraud, the sale could be accomplished even before the debt became due -presumably as soon as the parties had concluded the security agree ment.54 Moreover, since the debtor could agree to sell the collateral to pledgee or the pledgor, order a different form of sale, such as a private sale to a specific third party, so that higher proceeds may be realized." 54. Certain creditors, critics suspected, could easily take advantage of the inferior bargaining position of the debtor and pressure the debtor into an unfavorable sale, thus appropriating the collateral at a price well below its real value. See, e.g., 18 M. DURANTON, COURS DE DROIT FRAN<;AIS SUIVANT LE CODE CIVIl.. § 537 (1844).
Nevertheless, Duranton indicates that it was judged better to avoid establishing a formal prohibition of such sales when abuse was "almost impossible to foresee." See Additionally, commentators reveal various means of avoiding even the bedrock aversion to the "pacte commissoire," which consists of a clause in the security agreement allowing the creditor to retain the col lateral in the event of default. The parties could, for example, insert into their security agreement a clause authorizing the creditor to retain the collateral without recourse to the judiciary for proper valuation, as di rected by article 2078, but rather according to the valuation assigned to the collateral by third parties chosen by the debtor and creditor.56 Partic ularly daring creditors could take advantage of an arr angement bearing an even more striking resemblance to the pacte commissoire: the parties could agree in the security agreement that, in the event of default, the creditor would be allowed to choose any item from the property of the debtor as payment of the debt. Such a "conditional sale," even though clearly "not absolutely without danger for the debtor," was viewed as beyond the reach of the pledge law and therefore an acceptable circum vention of its restrictions.s7
Through similar liberal interpretation of the Russian Code, Russian judges might broaden the range of options available to secured parties.58 id. Similarly, another commentator wondered how one could, "without exaggerating and showing oneself to be more rigorous than the law itself," annul the debtor-to·credi tor sale in such a case. 2 PAUL PONT, EXPLICATION T HE ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL § 1162 (1867). While recognizing that the Code would nullify a clause in the security agreement that authorized the creditor to appropriate the collateral upon de fault, i.e., a pacte commissoire, Pont argues that negotiated sales are substantively different Id.
The loss of property is not here, as in the pacte commissoire, subordinated to a condition: the debtor immediately perceives the consequences of the consent that he is going to give; and if the conditions of the sale are too unfavorable to him, it is presumed that he will resist the obsessions of the creditor. Russian sellers might be able to take advantage of an analogous device, but this is by no means certain, and explicit provisions of the 70. See GK RF art. 170. The new article 170 appears to be simply a slightly re worded variant of its little-used predecessor in the RSFSR Civil Code, article 53. This may indicate that the revised article will change nothing, and only if the hidden transac tion is illegal will the judiciary reject the alternate structure. See KOMMENTARII GK RF, supra note 15, at 216 ("As a rule, the transaction that the sham transaction conceals is illegal."). On the other hand, attempting to take advantage of the buyer and create an extrastatutory security interest may be considered manipulative enough to apply this ar To avoid this problem, policymakers had to decide upon an appro priate mechanism for controlling the untrustworthy creditor and stand ardize the greatest return from the collateral. The debtor "finds his guarantee and his safeguard in the publicity of the sale, that is to say, in the call to the bidders, whose presence and competition give [the debtor] in some way the assurance that the pledge will be taken at its just value. "85 Public auction was supposed to shield the debtor from the chicanery in which the creditor normally would engage if she were given free reign over the sale procedure. 86
55
The virtues of obligatory public auction were subject to dispute, however, from the very beginning. One member of the French Conseil d'Etat suggested omitting the second clause of article 2078 from the Code, thereby permitting the parties to derogate in the security agree ment from the general restriction where it suited them.87 Berlier strongly opposed this proposition. He suspected that if the protection of the debtor were left to the will of the parties, the creditor would be free to impose upon the debtor her will from a superior bargaining position.
In such case, "a creditor of a sum of 1000 francs who held in pledge an asset worth 3000 francs would rush to sell it at an unfair price in order to be more promptly paid."88 In such a way, the security agreement might "degenerate into a usurious contract."89 Thus, as Berlier's posi- Id. at 133. He apparently has little confidence in the moral standards of any creditor, as tion finally emerged as the norm, both the letter and the spirit of the law seemingly aimed to protect the debtor.90
Berlier's view of the rapacious creditor is subject to challenge on several fronts. First, while in some discrete circumstances the debtor may need protection, at the outset it must be emphasized that the nor mal creditor is just as averse as the debtor, if not indeed more so, to foreclosure and forced liquidation of the collateral.91 Creditors take se curity interests not to profit at the expense of debtors who are likely to default, but in order to protect themselves if the debtor proves unable to fulfill her obligations. No rational creditor actually desires to subject herself, and the collateral on which she depends to satisfy the debt, to the process of foreclosure and realization -a process invariably at tended by an increase in transaction costs and a risk of inadequate retum.92
Even in the rare case when the possibility of a surplus from a sale exists, the creditor has every incentive to maximize resale price imme diately so as to avoid any possibility of the need to resort to the judicial process to regain the remainder of the outstanding debt.93 While resale he notes that "[o]therwise the creditor would never miss the opportunity to employ this means to escape the prohibitive rules of article 2078." Id. at 134. Boileux would "al ways presume" that predefault agreements providing the creditor with greater flexibility "mask usury," and that the debtor, subjugated to the will of the creditor by life's cir Most creditors holding security interests will agree that the last thing they wish to do is to enforce the security interest. What they want is payment of the debt, and they do not wish to undergo the trouble and expense of enforcement, which is re garded very much as a last resort.
Id. at 231-32; see also William B. Davenport, Default, Enforcement and Remedies Under Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U. L. REv. 265, 267 (1973) ("Naturally, the consequences of default are the last things that any party to a secured transaction wants to consider, and the default itself the last thing that any party wants to happen."). These comments are corroborated by Nicolas Ollivant, Credit Of ficer at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in London: "Banks never want to take the collateral and have to sell it. It is a difficult, time consuming, frustrating, and ultimately loss making process." CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 78.
92.
One commentator aptly points out that any creditor who purposely seeks out debtors likely to default and secures the debts relying on the eventual opportunity to profit upon realization of the collateral "is usually either a knave or a fool." Hogan, supra note 25, at 205. For an early contrary view, see supra note 89 .. 93. See, e.g., CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 58 (comments of Professor Breidenbach recognizing that the interests of the debtor and creditor at disposition are "at least partially identical"). For an excellent and highly detailed examination and cri-[Vol. 95:255 of the collateral is costless to the creditor -given that the expenses of the sale are secured by the sale proceeds ·along. with the amount of the secured debt94 -any amount the creditor manages to regain against the odds in a deficiency proceeding comes at the dear price of great ex penditures of time, money, and nerves. Schwartz sums up the situation well:
· Perhaps a more concise way of putting this is that every dollar the credi tor nets by resale reduces the outstanding debt by a dollar; every dollar the creditor defers to the deficiency action to collect will reduce the out standing debt by less than a dollar because the expected value of a litiga tion dollar is less than one, these dollars being subject to risk and delay.95
Any creditor who hopes to wring any more than the collateral out of the defaulting debtor exposes herself to the constant risk of imminent insol vency of a person who has once already proven unable to repay her fi nancial obligations.
Second, the fear that collateral with a value greatly exceeding the amount of the debt will be sold off by a thoughtless creditor for sub stantially less than its "real worth" is, in most cases, unsupported by the harsh realities of the forced resale market.96 Collateral, unfortu nately, does not come with a neat price tag attached that explicitly indi cates its "value." The value of an item must be determined according to what the market will produce.97 One common indicator of "fair" market value is the amount that a willing buyer under no compulsion to purchase would offer for the item in an arm's length sale by a willing seller under no compulsion to sell.98 In the context of a forced disposi tion following default, neither the creditor nor the debtor is a particu larly willing seller. This makes it difficult to achieve or even to predict tique of the proposition that creditors fail to maximize resale prices on a consistent ba sis, see Alan Schwartz, a fair market value for any given item, and the difficulty is enhanced when the law compels the seller to use an inefficient public auction ..
The vultures that hover around public auction grounds all have the same goal in mind: bid just enough to outdo the miser across the way, but in any case keep the bid as low as possible to walk away with a bargain piece of merchandise.99 No one can divine the price that any particular group of bidders assembled at the auction block will be will ing to pay for the collateral, particularly in remote regions where the value of money is greater and the bidders are less familiar with such sales than in the commercial centers.100 The function of the public auc tion for the participants is certainly not to provide the debtor with the protection of a fair price; on the contrary, the bidders want to take the collateral for as little as possible, and they know that the cards are al ready stacked in their favor by virtue of the circumstances of a forced disposal.1 0 1
Finally, one might challenge the hypothetical vast· surplus that the creditor supposedly lazily denies to the debtor upon hurried sale of the collateral. Experience has shown that any surplus to be returned to the debtor simply is not the norm for foreclosure sales; the concern of every creditor is avoiding the expected deficiency.10 2 Even in the rare case when the creditor obtains a surplus from disposition of the collat-99. Grant Gilmore characterized the typical assembly of bidders at public foreclo sure auctions as being "about as lively as a group of mourners at a funeral." GILMORE, supra note 11, § 44.6, at 1242; see also United States v. Conrad Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1978) . The majority in Conrad rejected a public auction based partly on its feeling that it had been poorly attended and that the few bidders who did attend showed little interest in the particular printing equipment being sold. See 589 F.2d at 951-52. The dissenting judge, however, retorted that while "only" 118 bidders attended the auction, "the majority fails to recognize that in a typical sale of foreclosed property one hundred sixteen fewer would have attended." 589 F.2d at 956 (Gibson, CJ., dis senting). The dissenter remarked that the "number far exceeds the minimum to be ex pected at a reasonably run auction of distressed goods." 589 F.2d at 956. 100. The accounts receivable of a large oil enterprise, for example, would sell for significantly more on a Moscow market than at a general public auction in remote Nizhnevartovsk. See also 2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 795, at 204 (discussing the supe riority of Paris as a market for "diamonds or other objects that can be sold well only in Paris"). For an example of one lawyer's attempted reliance on a more conservative, ru ral economic perspective to avoid an anticipated greater valuation of damages by a New York jury, see Gulf Oil v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1946) .
101. Private negotiation would much more readily allow the seller to conceal from potential buyers the fact of forced liquidation, allowing the seller to obtain a more rea sonable return.
102. Recall the somber observation of Gilmore that "(t]he surplus to be returned to the debtor after the sale is a glittering mirage; the deficiency judgment is the grim re ality." GILMORE, supra note 11, § 43 .2, at 1188. Gilmore continues by pointing out that "nine times out of ten," the creditor is the ultimate purchaser of the collateral and "pays not in cash but by a credit against the debt." Id. § 43.2, at 1188-89. This lends [Vol. 95:255 eral, it would be more efficient to control the occasional abusive credi tor by some sort of judicial scrutiny of the resale procedure rather than by encumbering all resales with the public auction requirement.103
Even more so than their counterparts in North America or Europe, creditors in Russia have a vested interest in immediately maximizing the return upon disposition of collateral. Conditions in Russia place sig nificant obstacles in the way of any creditor considering playing the market to evade her responsibilities to the debtor. The Russian market lacks consistent indicators that might allow the creditor to rely on ob taining any certain price for the collateral; to avoid great risk, she must pursue the disposition mechanism with the greatest potential for return.
If a deficiency remains, the creditor will be hard pressed to obtain full repayment from a debtor teetering on the verge of bankruptcy. Espe cially in the dynamic Russian economy, "public policy should no longer be made on the assumption that creditors do not maximize; the assumption must be the other way."104
Sp ecific Potential fo r Abuse in the Russian Sale Procedure
The procedures prescribed by Russian law for conducting the auc tion increase the potential for abusive creditor tactics. In fact, they place the debtor in a substantially worse position than if the initial realization procedure allowed for greater flexibility. By waiting until the situation becomes critical, the creditor can appropriate the devalued collateral and realize a premium by reselling the collateral later. This danger ex ists in more liberal systems as well, but the Russian system seems to encourage such an outcome and lacks a ready, built-in response to abuse.
Creditors have exploited the realization mechanism in the United States also, and Professors White and Summers offer a caveat to debt ors to be vigilant to such abuses: even more urgency to the misgivings about the Russian public auction procedure de scribed infra section II.B.2.
103. See, e.g., 2 ALAUZET, supra note 8, § 793 (defending the greater freedom given to the creditor by the French Commercial Code by noting that "all things may of fer the potential for abuse," but explaining that the legislators could not "sacrifice a principle of a great and incontestable utility, in the majority of cases, to entirely excep tional circumstances"); CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 58 (comments of Professor Breidenbach observing that an obligation for the creditor to act reasonably and to pay reparations for acting unreasonably provides sufficient protection to the debtor);
Schwartz, supra note 93, at 124 ("Article 9 of the UCC apparently responds intelli gently to the occasional cases of creditors' venality or sloth that will inevitably arise.").
104. Schwartz, supra note 93, at 139.
[S]ome secured creditors will be tempted first to hold a procedurally proper public sale where they buy the goods themselves for rather less (perhaps much less) than a private sale would have brought, and thereaf ter resell at a higher price through their private outlet -the outlet through which they would have conducted a private sale had they done so in the first place.105
Given a spiritless and poorly attended public auction, the creditor has every incentive to "succumbO to the natural temptation of 'buying' the property from himself at a fraction of its fair value."106 But the "com mercially reasonable" standard of the North American systems107 acts as the necessary disincentive to such schemes and allows the debtor to challenge this sort of manipulation.
The Russian law lacks any such explicit remedy. Under the current Code, avaricious creditors might exploit the abusive opportunity to reap a double benefit from the collateral in at least two ways. First, creditors certainly could apply to the Russian system the buy-and-resell scheme against which White and Summers forewarn. The creditor may bid at the auction, and as long as one more person appeared at the auction (perhaps someone enticed by the creditor) and either of them raised the initial bidding price by so much as a ruble, 108 the creditor could walk away from the auction with a bargain piece of collateral that might be sold subsequently in a different market under more conducive condi tions for significantly more money. The debtor would remain liable for 105. 4 WHITE & SUMME RS, supra note 31, § 34-11; see also In re Zsa Zsa Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (noting that judicial scrutiny of the auction price compared to estimated value is "especially appropriate where self dealing is alleged"), affd., 475 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973) . Jn one particularly egregious case of a creditor buy low-sell-high scheme, the creditor bought the collateral at public auction for $155,000 and then transferred it to a private party with whom he had concluded a contract in ad vance to resell the collateral for $950,000. See Boender v. Chicago North Clubhouse Assn., 608 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. 1992) . The court noted that "[i]t is difficult to imagine a factual situation where self-dealing by the secured creditor is more apparent" 608 N.E.2d at 212. A less shocking example appears in Savage Constr. v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 714 P.2d 573 (Nev. 1986), similarly involving a prearra nged resale to a third party by the creditor following public auction. There the numbers were not so disparate:
$158,000 auction price as compared to resale at $193,000 (still, a tidy profit of $35,000 to the crafty creditor convinced the court to remedy this situation as well Second, creditors can take advantage of the public-private price discrepancy even more efficiently under the Russian law by waiting un til the auction fails. If the debtor somehow convinces the creditor to agree to a relatively high initial bidding price, the creditor can smile and wait for the auction to take place. When no bidders show up, or if those few bidders who do appear balk at the price, and the auction is declared void, the creditor can blithely refuse to take the collateral at the asking price and await a second auction.110 When the second auction again proves fruitless, the creditor can take the collateral at a ten per cent discount and return to any remaining assets of the debtor for any deficiency.111 This statutory scheme produces the same result as the bid ding scenario described above, but the creditor is not even inconve nienced with the burden of bidding. She can simply bide her time if she feels that public auction at the agreed price is futile. As soon as the debtor ambles into the trap, the creditor snaps the door closed, taking the debtor for a possible deficiency and reselling the ill-gotten gain later for a tidy profit.
While judicial scrutiny may remedy some instances of this abuse, it is not clear that this practice is even prohibited by Russian law. Al lowing the creditor to proceed directly to a private sale, while imposing a duty to justify that procedure, would better combat the potential ill ef fects of manipulation of the sale.
C. Th e Lessons of North American History and Practice
This section focuses on the process in North America of searching for and choosing a realization mechanism that most efficiently and eq uitably balances debtor protection and creditor discretion. It submits that the U.S. commercial law experts who drafted Article 9 of the Uni (1924) . One should note particularly that § 19 of the U.C.S.A. prescribed public auction only when the debtor had already paid 50% of the purchase price of the goods. "If he ha[d] paid less, statistics show[ed] that nothing is realized for the buyer on a resale. The depreciation of the goods more than eats up the buyer's equity. Where there is no chance of benefiting the buyer, a compulsory resale is a useless and expen sive fonnality." UNIF. CoNDmONAL SALES ACT § 19, commissioners' note, 2 U.L. A. 34 (1922) . Under § 20 of the Act, the buyer could always demand a resale, even if she had only paid an insignificant portion of the purchase price, but the Commissioners considered it "undesirable to· require such resale as a matter of law in cases where busi ness experience shows that it can do no good." UNIF. CoNDmoNAL SALES ACT § 19, commissioners' note, 2 U.L. A. 34 (1922) . Thus, the requirement of public auction was looked upon only with reserved favor even at its prime in American law. . Vol. 95:255 Standing on the opposite end of the spectrum, the Uniform Trust Receipts -Act allowed the creditor much more freedom to choose the most efficient realization mechanism.114 The drafters of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act believed that the provisions for obliging the creditor to return to the debtor any surplus from the sale adequately "pre serve[d] the [debtor's] protection against forfeiting his equity of re demption."115 Most importantly, the drafters asserted that "by simplify ing the procedure and giving certainty of security, the Act cheapens the dealer's financing, which in turn redounds to the benefit of the consum ing public."116
The functionality and freedom of the Trust Receipts Act eventually emerged as the choice for the new Article 9, and the comments of two prominent scholars closely connected with the drafting effort explain this result First, Harold Birnbaum, who acted as advisor to the report ers for Article 9, rejected the notion that the flexible option chosen was unduly favorable to secured creditors.117 He defended the loosening of restrictions by pointing to the desired benefits of eliminating "wasteful expenses" connected with secured lending and ultimately reducing the cost of secured credit to the consuming public.118 Birnbaum counted this 114. Upon default, the creditor could take possession of and was then empowered to sell the goods, documents, or instruments covered by the trust receipt "at public or private sale." UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS ACT § 6(3)(b) (withdrawn 1951), 9C U.L. A. 247 (1957) . The creditor was obligated to account to the debtor for any surplus from the sale remaining after payment of the debt, but she retained the right subsequently to claim a deficiency if the proceeds fell short of the amount owed. See UNIF. TRUST RE CEIPTS ACT § 6(3)(b) (withdrawn 1951), 9C U.L. A. 247 (1957 118. See id.; see also Schwartz, supra note 93, at 117 ("Consumers who grant se curity interests to creditors pay lower interest rates in return .... "); infra note 129.
Birnbaum's comments reflect the policy struggle to which the disposition provi sions of Article 9 responded. The drafters attempted to achieve the elusive and delicate balance between two policy positions: "one, a desire to impede dishonest dispositions, and the other, a reluctance to strangle honest transactions with red tape.'' Hogan, supra note 25, at 220; see also Grant Gilmore, Article 9 of the Un iform Commercial Code -Part V: Default, 7 CoNF. ON PERS. FIN. L.Q. REP. 4, 7 (1952) (describing the goal of avoiding either of two extremes: "setting the barriers against fraud so high that legiti mate business operations are blocked •.. [or] setting them so low that fraud flourishes unchecked"). But see CIS CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 106 (comments of Aleksandr enhanced flexibility among the major advances of Article 9. He recog nized that "[t]he rigid formality of old-fashioned foreclosures has often resulted in loss to all except those who purchased at foreclosure sales. " 119 Second, Grant Gilmore, a preeminent scholar of personal property security in the United States and Associate Reporter for Article 9, ex pressed his even greater conviction that more liberal realization provi sions were superior to the old limited mechanisms. 1 20 Gilmore chal lenged the Uniform Conditional Sales Act's insistence on public auction, declaring that it "guarant[ eed] that the property would go for less than it was wor th ." 1 2 1 Gilmore emphasized his "firmly held belief" that requirements like the Russian public auction provision "make it impossible to dispose of the collateral at a decent price." 1 22 While rec ognizing that the limitations were designed with protection of the debtor in mind, Gilmore lamented the fact that "the cure . . . [had] proved worse than the disease. " 1 23
Moreover, Gilmore challenged the effectiveness of public auction in preventing fraud. He insisted that rigid statutory procedures, like the Makovskii outlining his concerns about the untoward effects of foreclosures on consum ers who might "end up as a practical matter with absolutely nothing, thrown out onto the street").
119. Birnbaum, supra note 117, at 390; see also Davenport, supra note 91, at 306 ("Much of the credit for [the complete taking hold of Article 9] must go to the flexibil ity of the Code provisions."). 121. Gilmore, supra note 118, at 7. Compare Gilmore's appraisal with the com ments of Homer Kripke, a former member of the Subcommittee of the American Law Institute on Article 9: "Everybody knows in practice that public sales are usually per functory, and nobody bids but the creditor." Homer Kripke, Kentucky Modernizes the Law of Chattel Security, 48 KY. LJ. 369, 386 (1960) .
See
Moreover, Kripke questions the very necessity of a foreclosure and sale if the sup posed value in the collateral to be protected by public auction actually exists. If the debtor expected to reap any significant gain from the sale of the collateral, Kripke ar gues, the debtor would not leave the details of the sale to the creditor. She would sell the goods herself to avoid default and completely escape any danger of creditor negli gence, or the debtor would find substitute financing using the valuable collateral as se curity. See id. The debtor's inability to rely on either of these escape devices shows that the value expected from a general offering to the public in the area where the debtor has been conducting business all along likely will not produce any excess return.
122. Gilmore, supra note 120, at 43. 123. Id. Despite Gilmore's seemingly strong aversion to public auction, he initially backed away from this position by indicating that the creditor might always permissibly choose public auction over private sale. See Gilmore, supra note 118, at 10. Later, though, after another prominent commentator challenged this proposition, Gilmore re canted and recognized that the challenger was "obviously right" about public auction potentially failing the commercial reasonableness test. See GILMORE, supra note 11, § 44.6, at 1245 & n.12.
, Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:255 requirement of public auction, have always been and will always be in capable of preventing actual fraud: "On the rockiest ledge, in the tiniest cranny, through the most nearly invisible loophole, fraud knows how to flourish luxuriantly. This is disquieting but true." 124 Public auction pro ceedings, Gilmore explained, are commonly dominated by "local gangs of thieves" who appropriate the collateral through collusive bidding ar rangements only to "grow fat" later by selling their ill-gotten gain on a more conducive market.125 Far from accomplishing its goal of debtor protection, the public auction requirement in fact shifts the benefit away from the debtor to those who least deserve it. 125. See Gilmore, supra note 120, at 43; see also supra notes 105-11, 119 and ac companying text.
126. R.S.O., ch. P. 10 (1990) (Ont.). Since the provisions of the PPSA have under gone only slight alterations in subsequent adoptions by other provinces, this section fo cuses on the language appearing in the law of Ontario, the first province to enact the PPSA.
127. See Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O., ch. P.10, § § 58- 66 (1990) . The PPSA permits the creditor to dispose of the collateral "by public sale, private sale, lease or otherwise and ... may be made at any time and place and on any terms so long as every aspect of the disposition is commercially reasonable." Personal Property Security Act, R.S.O., ch. P. 10, § 63 (2) (1990 (Supp. 1986) . Similar re form sentiments have been voiced on the other side of the border as well. Alejandro Garro delivered a particularly vehement attack on the public auction regime in the states of his native South America:
A fair determination of the parties' mutual rights does not have to suffer because of the need to dispose of the collateral in a costly and cumbersome public sale. Any collateral realization system which demands a sale by public auction is bound to work inefficiently. Most public sales are sparsely attended and conse quently prices are notoriously low, to the detriment of both the secured creditor and the debtor. The obvious justification for requiring a sale by a public official is that the debtor is afforded some needed protection. But even this purpose is not
The malleable provisions of Article 9 and the PPSA have enjoyed success in North America because of their free adaptability to any situa tion, allowing the parties to arrive at the most acceptable means of reap ing the benefit of their security agreement. The policyma1cers who formed these provisions shared the same concern for debtor protection that motivated Russian legislators to impose the public auction restric tion. But the North American approach bestows the benefit from the disposition on the parties who deserve protection, rather than on bargain shoppers at public auction. The more flexible provisions acknowledge that an optimal return on collateral is the best form of protection for both parties.129 U.S. and Canadian lawmakers recognized that regular commercial �hannels are predisposed to producing acceptable returns, and they feared that public auction most often produces just the oppo site effect. But rather than make a rigid choice responsive to only one subset of transactions, the North American drafters left the choice to those familiar with the factors at hand at any given moment, including the particular conditions of the agreement, market conditions, and other similarly unpredictable contingencies. Lawmakers did not cede total control to the parties, as the next section d emonstrates, but their com promise provides much-needed flexibility in modern commercial trans actions in a rapidly and unpredictably changing market.
Judicial Practice and Commercial Unreasonableness
The drafters of Article 9 provided creditors with a flexible standard for realization of collateral, but they tempered this flexibility with an explicit protective requirement that "every aspect of the disposition in cluding the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commeraccomplished because many of the public auctions are controlled by hired bid ders who dominate the auction and restrain bidding.
Alejandro M. Garr o, Security Interests in Personal Property in Latin America: A Com parison with Article 9 and a Model fo r Reform, 9 Hous. J. INTL. L. 157, 235-36 (1987) . 129. French lawmakers recognized the reciprocal benefits available to the debtor by protecting the creditor when they were adopting their new Commercial Code:
There is no doubt that ... when every lender secured by commercial pledge will be sure of recovering his loan easily, without costs and on the appointed day, there will be a greater number of bankers and capitalists disposed to lend to com merce with the security of a pledge, and that they will lend at a more moderate rate of interest One can thus say here that to favor the creditor is in fact to favor the debtor. 137. The publicity created by the "experienced auctioneer" whom the creditor had hired attracted a crowd of 106 bidders. See 554 F.2d at 690. It is particularly noteworthy that even with this substantial attendance and an experienced auctioneer, the sale pro duced an abnormally low return. Part of the problem was an auctioneer who was unfa miliar with the collateral, who "did not know the difference in value between a ninety cent optical coupler and a one-cent capacitor," both of which comprised a significant portion of the collateral. 554 F.2d at 690. One can be sure that problems like these will be even more prevalent with a court officer conducting the sale.
138. See 554 F.2d at 690.
alone might have produced almost twice as much as the final auction return, and this factor, among others, influenced the court to return the case to the jury, who, the court thought, could reasonably have con cluded that such a sale fell short of the standard of commercial reasona bleness.13 9 Subsequently, in United States v. Wi llis,140 the court held that the assumption that public auction was inherently reasonable was "clearly false" and that the creditor had unreasonably chosen a public over a private sale in the circumstances.141 In both Te rrey and Wi llis, public auction simply did not, and likely could not, produce a return su perior to that of a private disposition. Without the commercial reasona bleness standard applied through judicial supervision of these sales, the debtors would have been the real victims in the end.
Concluding Challenges
Current Russian law fails to take into account significant variances in the marketability of various types of collateral, and it inhibits produc tive reliance on modem means of commerce. Public auction may well be the most efficient mechanism for disposing of certain kinds of collat 1375 , 1381 -82 (10th Cir. 1976 ). Creditors should be allowed to take advantage of at least this simple value-adding factor. The benefit derived from professional handling of the sale will, in most cases, far outweigh any slight increase in procedural costs.
[Vol. 95:255 large factory equipment, 144 oil rigs, 145 and large quantities of most sorts of inventory146 that simply would not fm d an appropriate buyer at the average public auction. More exotic collateral and goods that appeal only to a particular discrete group of potential buyers, such as Lear jets,147 specialized inventory,148 and specialized farm and other equip ment, 149 are all the more ill-suited to liquidation through general public offering. As one U.S. court has observed, "it is obvious that in dispos ing of unique collateral the secured party must make significant at tempts to reach the most logical purchasers." 150 If legislators truly wish to protect the debtor, they should permit the creditor to utilize the most reliable means possible of profitably disposing of these items. In many,
if not most, instances, this will involve some sort of private, negotiated sale.
Many of these sales should be accomplished with the assistance of the mechanisms already in place with the resources and experience to handle particular sales in the most efficient manner.151 For example, pre cious metals, gems, 152 and securities, 153 likely to become increasingly common sources of collateral in Russia, should be sold through ex changes, where the forced nature of the sale can be hidden to avoid an adverse effect on the value, and where experienced sellers combine with sophisticated buyers to arrive at the most favorable price on the market at any given time.154
Finally, with the aid of modem technology, private negotiation can exploit markets fa r removed from the place of the collateral to secure a significantly better price. Willing buyers may not want to take the long and expensive trip from, for example, Moscow to Krasnoyarsk or Vla divostok to attend an auction. These potential buyers may offer terms of sale through private negotiation by phone, fa x, and so on, that signifi cantly eclipse the run-of-the-mill bid at public auction. This should be particularly so in the case of collateral that appeals to a limited class of Moving the burden of resale from lenders, whose expertise and facilities are normally limited to lending, to dealers, who possess the knowledge and resources to ef fectuate productive sales, apparently figured prominently in the U.S. drafters' decision to abandon strict adherence to public auctions. See U.C.C. § 9-507 cmt. 2 (1990) ("One recognized method of disposing of repossessed collateral is for the secured party to sell the collateral to or through a dealer -a method which in the long run may realize bet ter average returns since the secured party does not usually maintain his own facilities for making such sales.").
purchasers. The higher price achieved through private, long-distance ne gotiation would clearly benefit both the creditor and the debtor.155
In conclusion, it seems highly unlikely that public auctions in Eu rope or Russia offer better potential for high returns than in the United States. Moreover, the general weaknesses and potential for abuse of the public auction me chanism are exacerbated by the dangers implicit in the current Russian procedure for conducting the sale.156 Russian lawmakers should alter in some way the present system of obligatory public auc-· tion and restricted access to commercial markets to avoid the clear po tential for problems more far-ranging than those that disquieted lawmakers originally.
ill . PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRE NT REGIME
This Part argues that something closer to the North American ap proach of optimal creditor freedom controlled by judicial review best serves the interests of all concerned parties. While problems of the stan dard of judicial review will require serious analysis and resolution of difficult problems, legislators ought to fulfill their responsibilities to their constituents by providing recourse to the most productive disposi tion arran gement available.
Russian reformers might choose from among a number of interme diate stages between the present law and the more liberal North Ameri can system. First, the law might provide greater independence to the parties. Rather than forcing the debtor and creditor to observe the public auction restrictions regardless of their wishes, the law could allow the parties to agree upon an alternate form of disposition after conclusion of the security agreement. This option exists in one form or another in all of the European systems analyzed above.
Whether the parties conclude such an agreement before or after de fault, however, conservative critics might fear significant creditor pres sure on the debtor to accede to the creditor's will.157 But despite the mi nor differences in the debtor-creditor relationship before and after default, it makes little difference when the parties are permitted to dero-155. The Russian procedural law permits the parties to transport the collateral to another, more suitable location for auction as one way of accomplishing a similar result. gate from the norm. As soon as the debtor takes possession of the loan, the bargaining positions of the parties change fundamentally. The debtor no longer finds herself at the mercy of the creditor; on the contrary, it is the creditor who finds herself in a risky position. The creditor cannot place inordinate pressure on the debtor before default because she can not legally foreclose before then. The creditor might threaten the debtor before default that every minor divergence from the agreement will re sult not in renegotiation or cooperation by the creditor, but rather in im mediate foreclosure.158 But foreclosure is most often not in the interest of the creditor in any event. The only real leverage that the creditor can apply after conclusion of the agreement and transfer of the loan funds is the loss of future goodwill or, more precisely, fear that the creditor will . withhold loan funds in the future. Ye t this is the case after default as well. As a first step, permitting any sort of agreement between the par ties that allows them to diverge from the general rule of public sale in troduces a bit more welcome flexibility into the realization procedure.
This first hesitant step of countenancing debtor-creditor agreement, however, is both too restrictive and perhaps too permissive. If the credi tor presents to the debtor a plan to dispose of the collateral to a private party through negotiated sale, and if the creditor can prove a significant likelihood of inferior return from public auction, why should the law al low an intransigent, unsophisticated, or simply foolish debtor irration ally to refuse such an option? What if, for instance, a bankrupt debtor finds herself so far in debt to other creditors that she could care less about the return to be gained from the collateral? A surplus will not in ure to the debtor's benefit; it will simply trickle off to the remaining creditors, and a subsequent deficiency claim will rank lower than all of the other claims against which the debtor has sought protection in bank ruptcy. The desire of the creditor to squeeze out as much value from the collateral as possible is of no great concern to this insolvent and indif ferent debtor. Permitting the debtor in this instance to inhibit the credi tor's good faith efforts to seek out the most lucrative return on the col lateral would be inefficient and unjust. On the other hand, it is no more acceptable to allow the creditor to exert on the debtor some sort of un desirable influence based on the creditor 's superior bargaining position.
One should at least provide for judicial scrutiny of the agreement process.
158. See, e.g., PONT, supra note 54, § 1157. Professor Coogan also alludes to the convincing force of such implicit creditor coercion: "The debtor's agreement after de fault . . . is not likely to be given without his knowing on which side his bread is but tered." Coogan, supra note 153, at 523.
[Vol. 95:255 A second potential step by Russian refonners toward a more North American-like system adds the court to the picture: the law might per mit the creditor to choose to bypass the debtor and petition the court di rectly for authorization to pursue a desired alternate course of disposi tion. Even this approach, though, has its faults. If the creditor in fact finds a more lucrative means of realizing on the collateral, especially when such disposition would result in no deficiency or even a surplus, the vast majority of debtors would fe el fortunate that they escaped vir tually unscathed after default. 1 59 If all creditors who met with debtor in transigence had to get a judicial declaration for such instances, many cases that would otherwise eventually have been settled amicably with out the involvement of the court will now needlessly clutter the judicial docket. This will force the parties to incur unnecessary and deleterious transaction costs, including not only direct court costs, but also lost op portunity costs for wasteful diversion of time and other resources. The concept of taking security exists in large part precisely to avoid costly recourse to the court following default. Moreover, since the return from the collateral will now be used to defray the additional court costs, a deficiency may arise that might have been avoided without court in volvement. Although permitting the court to place its imprimatur on al ternate dispositions is certainly superior to blind, rigid, and ineffective public auction requirements, the parties' rights might be protected more efficiently if court involvement were limited to those instances where it was actually necessary. 1 60
If Russian refonners agree that each of these previous steps im proves the situation slightly but not enough, the final step toward bal ancing debtor and creditor interests brings the lawmakers to something closer to the North American approach. The law should allow the credi tor to choose freely how to dispose of the collateral, but it should re quire her to justify that disposition if the debtor feels dissatisfied. This approach represents the best available alternative despite the monitoring costs associated with judicial "reasonability" review of the creditor's 159. See, e.g., White, supra note 25, at 867 ("The nonnal business debtor is not seeking a court ordered foreclosure with its attendant costs if a smaller deficiency upon resale will be realized by a private sale or eliminated entirely by an acceptance of the collateral as satisfaction for the indebtedness or obligation.").
160. If the creditor wishes to dispose of the collateral in a certain way, yet fe els unsure about the commercial reasonableness of that disposition, she should be allowed to rely on a declarative judgment Article 9, for example, protects the creditor with a conclusive .presumption of commercial reasonableness for dispositions that have been "approved in any judicial proceeding or by any bona fide creditors' committee or repre sentative of creditors." U.C.C. § 9-507(2) (1990). If the creditor chooses to seek refuge in the court, the law should not discourage or deny such an exercise of prudent caution.
choice.161
In most instances the rational debtor will be satisfied with the greater return that the shrewd creditor managed to acquire by way of an alternate, more lucrative realization mechanism. Additionally, by obvi ating the need to resort immediately to either initial agreement or court action, the parties will avoid needless transaction costs.
The law must maintain some check on creditor freedom, however, and the court can most efficiently play its guiding role at the final stage For just a few of the myriad cases and ample commentary dealing with the issue of judicial deter mination of commercial reasonableness, see the collection of materials on § 9-504 in 3B U.L. A. 127, 136-40, 212-55 (1992) . These problems may well be complicated further by the overloaded and understaffed Russian court system. Nonetheless, American courts have faced sitnilar problems, particularly in the large metropolitan areas where secured transactions litigation is most prevalent, and it is a more acceptable solution for legisla tors to attend to the pervasive problems in the court system than simply to capitulate to such challenges by restraining productive marlcet flexibility. · 162. See, e.g., Gn . .MORE, supra note 11, § 44.5, at 1237 ("The secured party is not required to be a seer or a prophet .••• He is required to act with due diligence, to use his best efforts •... ").
163. For an example of the dangers of demanding too much from the creditor, see
Ve tter v. Bank of Or., 591 P. 2d 768 (Or. Ct App. 1979) . Gilmore considered that the law might have gone even furtl\er than the liberal allowances of Article 9, particularly in protecting the creditor's choice of an alternate disposition mechanism. See GILMORE, supra note 11, § 44.6, at 1246. He expressed his confidence that if this section of Arti cle 9 were redrafted , "it should be possible, with ingenuity, perseverance and luck, to take a longer step in the same direction." Id.
164. It must be emphasized, however, that exact equivalence between Article 9 or the PPSA and the Russian law likely would not represent the best choice for Russian lawmakers, and this Note does not advocate such legal imperialism. This Note simply suggests that legislators should bear in mind the celebrated success of Article 9 when considering sitnilar laws for their countries. Alejandro Garro, for example, advocates re forming the security interest laws of Latin American countries according to the model of Article 9. See Garro, supra note 128, at 199; Alejandro M. Garro, The Refo rm and [Vol. 95:255 in the creditor 's choice of a realization mechanism, be it by public or private sale or otherwise. 1 65 If the creditor can arr ange for a truly more commercially reasonable disposition of the collateral, it seems counter productive and illogical to refuse to permit the creditor to pursue such an option. The creditor should, however, notify the debtor of the final choice, permitting the debtor to protect her own best interests by fulfil ling the secured obligation or purchasing the collateral herself. The onus of finding a reasonable means of disposition and possibly having to convince a court of its superiority, however, must remain with the creditor. This quid pro quo approach strikes the delicate balance be tween debtor and creditor interests and deserves serious consideration by any legislator wrestling with the problem of controlling the disposi tion of collater aI.1 66 CONCLUSION Functional and rational laws providing a stable environment for in vestment will represent the first line of defense in adequately protecting Harmonization of Personal Property Security Law in Latin America, 59 REV. JUR. U.P.R 1 (1990). While Latin America certainly is not identically situated with Russia, one can draw compelling analogies between the development of the Russian and Latin American economies.
165. The two most common forms of disposition "otherwise" than by sale would be leasing the collateral and allowing the creditor simply to retain the collateral in satis faction of the debt First, especially when the collateral had been leased before default, REV. 211, 217 (1966) . Such situa tions, however, will represent the exception rather than the norm. See Davenport, supra note 91, at 283; Brian Siegel, Th e Commercially Reasonable Disp osition of Collateral, 80 COM LJ. 67, 67 n.4 (1975) .
Second, in some situations, the parties may both be better off without a resale. See U.C.C. § 9-505 cmt. 1 (1990); see also Hogan, supra note 25, at 215-19. Particularly if the collateral consists of commercial paper, accounts, and chattel paper (some of the most important sources of credit for most struggling small businesses), sale will nor mally produce less than collection and retention by the creditor.
166. This paradigm of liberal allowances to the creditor tempered by a judicial check has received the valuable endorsement of Professor Ulrich Drobnig of the Max Russia's interests in the tremendous competition for capital in the world today. The practice of establishing security in property plays a central role in the general scheme of investor comfort; therefore, the law of se cured transactions should be particularly sensitive to the needs of inves tors and borrowers alike. An effective realization mechanism lies at the heart of this law, ensuring the consistency and predictability that are so crucial to the parties concerned.
Russian legislators have produced a sophisticated framework with enormous potential for facilitating secured transactions, but they have simultaneously debilitated this impressive structure by inhibiting its cru cial realization phase. Imposing a public auction limitation on the credi tor 's disposition of the collateral is a mistake founded on unstable pol icy grounds. First, while the successful commercial markets of Europe function adequately despite the same sort of restriction, each of the Eu ropean states whose civil codes likely influenced Russia's reform effort has included explicit statutory language, narrowly construed the statu tory language, or countenanced independent evasive techniques that mitigate the untoward effects of the public auction restriction. Second, creditors normally do not negligently devalue the collateral, and the public auction limitation actually worsens the debtor's predicament by ensuring a low return on the collateral: Finally, U.S. commercial experi ence has demonstrated the shortcomings of the institution of public auction.
In view of these problems, Russian legislators should institute a more flexible, responsive legal regime for scrutinizing the disposition of collateral. Providing access to the most effective means available for obtaining the maximum return from the collateral will shift the benefit from the denizens of public auctions to more appropriate recipientsdebtors and creditors .
Formulating a workable standard by which to evaluate the disposi tion of collateral will demand hard thinking, much more so than the simple imposition of a clear and simple rule against all forms of dispo sition other than public auction. But relatively successful models al ready exist, and legislators owe it to their constituents to find the opti mal solution to the problem of debtor-creditor relations after default. A simple limitation dating from the last century should not be allowed to persist simply based on its venerability. Public auction fails to perform the function for which it was designed, and such time-worn, reactionary rules should be replaced by more complex and sensitive standards that reflect the modem times to which they must adapt.
